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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the National Bank Act,1 known as the Mc-
Fadden Act, in 1927 in an effort to strengthen the national bank-
ing system and to place it at a level of competitive equality with
state banking systems.2 Prior to 1927 national banks could not es-
tablish branch banks. Federal law permitted national banks to op-
erate only out of one office in the state in which the bank was lo-
cated.3 State law, however, governed state-chartered banks and
often permitted branching with varying degrees of geographical re-
1. National Bank [McFadden] Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927), as
amended by Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (1933) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982)).
2. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 257, 261 (1966); Com-
ment, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and the McFadden Act Definition of a
"Branch Bank," 42 U. CHL L. REv. 362, 372 (1975).
3. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1152 (1981); Comment, Cir-
cumventing the McFadden Act: The Comptroller of the Currency's Efforts to Broaden the
Branching Capabilities of National Banks, 72 Ky. L.J. 707, 712 & n.37 (1983-84).
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strictions.4 The McFadden Act allowed national banks to establish
branches if state banks in that particular state enjoyed similar
freedom.5 Representative McFadden, the sponsor of the bill, stated
in his analysis of the Act that the statute would both preserve the
dual banking system and promote competitive equality between
national and state banks.6
Section 36(f) of the National Bank Act defines a bank branch
as "any branch place of business . . . at which deposits are re-
ceived, or checks paid, or money lent."'7 Federal courts in recent
years have interpreted section 36(f) under circumstances very dif-
ferent from those that existed in 1927. The growing use of auto-
matic teller machine systems (ATMs),s customer-bank communi-
cation terminals (CBCTs),9 and point-of-sale (POS)lo terminals
4. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1152.
5. Under the McFadden Act, national banks follow state law regarding the location of
national branch banks. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982). Section 36(c) provides that:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town or
village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at
the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and
(2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establish-
ment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the
State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not
merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location im-
posed by the law of the State on State banks.
Id.
6. Representative McFadden stated: "As a result of the passage of this act, the na-
tional bank act has been so amended that national banks are able to meet the needs of
modern industry and commerce and competitive equality has been established among all
member banks of the Federal reserve system." 68 CONG. REc. 5815 (1927).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1982). Section 36(f) provides in full:
The term "branch" as used in this section shall be held to include any branch bank,
branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business located
in any State or Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia at which
deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.
8. An ATM is an electronic funds transfer terminal that can perform such banking
services as deposits, withdrawals, account transfers, balance inquiries, extensions of credit,
and payments to third parties. A customer activates the terminal with an access card and a
personal identification number. See N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIc FUND
TRANSFER SYSTEMS 6.01 (1980).
9. The Comptroller of the Currency defines a CBCT branch as "an automated device,
established (i.e., owned or rented) by a national bank at a location separate from the main
office or a domestic branch, that: (1) Takes deposits, or (2) Disburses cash drawn against:
(i) A customer's deposit account, or (ii) A customer's pre-approved loan account." 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.31(b) (1985).
10. Point-of-sale (POS) terminals are terminals located "anywhere consumers pay for
goods or services." Goldberg, Shared Electronic Funds Transfer Systems: Some Legal Im-
plications, 98 BANKING L.J. 715, 718 (1981). POS terminals provide two types of services:
check authorization and guarantee services and direct debit services. Id.
1622
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has spawned increasing controversy and litigation over the issue of
whether electronic fund transfer (EFT) systems 1 actually are
branches of the banks that use them.
A recent federal district court decision, Independent Bankers
Association v. Marine Midland Bank, held that a national bank
violated the McFadden Act by participating in an interstate ATM
network that used an ATM owned and operated by a New York
supermarket.13 The district court decision threatened to cause a
major crisis in the banking industry by effectively prohibiting na-
tional banks from participating in shared ATM network systems.
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the district court decision, holding that
the McFadden Act excludes an ATM that a national bank does not
own or operate from the definition of a branch bank for federal law
purposes. 4 Congress also reacted to the district court decision by
holding hearings on a proposed amendment to the National Bank
Act that, if passed, would overrule effectively and permanently the
district court decision. 15
This Recent Development contends that the Second Circuit's
reversal of the lower court decision only temporarily preserves the
regional and national interchange systems that have become in-
creasingly popular in the last several years. Federal legislation is
necessary to ensure the development of electronic banking technol-
ogy and to reestablish competitive equality in the dual banking
system. Part II traces the treatment of ATMs and shared ATM
networks by state legislatures, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and federal courts since the enactment of the McFadden
Act. Part III discusses the Marine Midland Bank decision as the
first case to call into question the validity of shared ATM net-
works. Part III also introduces the Banking Convenience Act of
1984, which is Congress' reaction to the district court decision in
Marine Midland Bank. Part IV analyzes the effect that Marine
Midland Bank will have on the future use of ATMs by national
banks and encourages passage of a proposed amendment to the
11. EFT systems are computer systems that handle bank payment services and proce-
dures. See N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 8, N 1.01.
12. 583 F. Supp. 1042 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985).
13. The district court also held that the national bank's use of the ATM violated New
York's home office protection law. 583 F. Supp. at 1048.
14. 757 F.2d 453, 463 (2d Cir. 1985).
15. See The Banking Convenience Act of 1984, S. 2898, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. See gen-
erally infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text for discussion of Senate Hearings on the
proposed amendment.
1985] 1623
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McFadden Act, which effectively codifies the Marine Midland
Bank appellate decision. Part V concludes that Congress should
act promptly, despite the Second Circuit's reversal of the Marine
Midland Bank district court decision, to clarify the legal status of
shared ATMs for national banks and to regain the competitive
equality that Congress thought it achieved in 1927 with the Na-
tional Bank Act.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Competitive Equality
1. The McFadden Act
Congress enacted the McFadden Act16 in 1927 in response to
the Comptroller of the Currency's requests to act to avert the po-
tential destruction of the national banking system.1 Branching
among state-chartered banks grew in large proportion from 1900 to
1923, yet national banks could not participate in similar expansion
because Congress had not provided for branch banking for national
banks."' The Comptroller feared that national banks would convert
to state banks in order to enjoy the benefits of state law.' 9
The McFadden Act permitted national banks to operate
branches in the same locations and to the same extent that state
law permitted state banks to engage in branch banking; the Act,
therefore, left to the states the ultimate decision of whether to al-
low national banks the privilege of branch banking.20 By deferring
16. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
17. See Comment, supra note 3, at 712-14. See generally First Nat'l Bank v. Walker
Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 256-67 (1966) (stating that national banks are instruments
of the federal government for exercising fiscal powers).
18. See First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924) (federal law confined
national banking associations to one office or banking house); see also Illinois ex rel. Lignoul
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 n.1 (N.D. IM. 1975), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976); Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 712 (legislative omission interpreted as prohibiting branch banking
by national banks). In First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri the Court discussed the existence of the
national banking system and stated that although national banks are instruments of the
federal government, "national banks are subject to the laws of a State in respect of their
affairs unless such laws interfere with the purposes of their creation, tend to impair or de-
stroy their efficiency as federal agencies or conflict with the paramount law of the United
States." 263 U.S. at 656.
19. See Comment, supra note 2, at 373 (Representative McFadden described "acceler-
ating trend towards conversion of national banks into state chartered institutions"); Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 712 n. 37 (national banks began changing to state charters to achieve
increased banking authority).
20. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust
[Vol. 38:16211624
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to the states, Congress achieved its goal of preserving competitive
equality and avoided a confrontation with states' rights advocates.
Under the Act national banks could profitably retain their national
status because they could participate in local competition for busi-
ness and offer services and branch offices similar to those that
state banks offered.2 1 Congress, however, did not delegate complete
decisionmaking power to the states. Congress intended the ques-
tion of what constituted a national bank branch to remain a fed-
eral question to which federal law would apply.22
In First National Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, ' a leading
early case construing the McFadden Act, the United States Su-
preme Court provided a starting point for subsequent lower court
analyses of purported bank branching activities that involved elec-
tronic terminals. In Plant City the Court considered (1) whether a
national bank's use of an armored car messenger service to deliver
cash to and pick up deposits from its customers constituted branch
banking, and (2) whether an off-premises receptacle used for de-
posits constituted branch banking. 4 The Court first reviewed the
policy considerations supporting the McFadden Act25 and empha-
sized that federal law was responsible for defining the term
"branch" for a national bank.26
Referring to section 36(f) of the McFadden Act 7 and noting
that the statutory definition of a branch bank did not use conclu-
Co., 385 U.S. at 260. According to the Court, after the Banking Act of 1933 amended the
National Bank Act, Congress permitted national banks to establish outside branches if state
banks could establish such branches under state law. Id.
21. See supra note 6.
22. See First Nat'I Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 134 (1969); North
Davis Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 820, 822 (10th Cir. 1972); Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167, 1172 (N.D. In. 1975), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
23. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
24. Id. at 126. Under a contract between First National Bank and its customers, the
armored car messenger was the agent of the customer and transactions were not complete
until delivered at the bank's premises. The Court stated that although nothing precluded
the parties from making these contractual agreements, the arrangements could not deter-
mine the applicability of § 36(f). Id. at 136. The Florida Comptroller had advised First
National that the activities constituted illegal branching under Florida law. Id. at 125 n.1;
see FLA. STAT. § 659.06(1)(a) (1966).
25. See Plant City, 396 U.S. at 133. According to the Court, "The policy of competi-
tive equality is ... firmly embedded in the statutes governing the national banking system.
The mechanism of referring to state law is simply one designed to implement that congres-
sional intent and build into the federal statute a self-executing provision to accommodate to
changes in state regulation." Id.
26. Id. at 134.
27. See supra note 7.
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sive, limiting terminology, the Court reasoned that any location of-
fering even one of the three services mentioned in section
36(f)-receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money-was a
branch.28 The Court asserted that the armored car messenger ser-
vice and the off-premises deposit receptacles did provide the na-
tional bank with a competitive advantage over state banks because
state law prohibited state banks from offering these customer con-
veniences. 29 The Court, therefore, held that the armored car and
the off-premises receptacle constituted illegal branches.30 Case law
following the Plant City decision generally has relied on a strict
statutory interpretation of a branch and has limited the forms of
bank services that national banks can provide to their customers."
2. State Branching Laws and EFT Systems
State branch banking laws, although differing in some re-
spects, generally allow branch banking with various geographical
restrictions.2 Eighteen states and the District of Columbia permit
state-wide branch banking;33 twenty-three states provide for
28. The Court noted:
Although the definition may not be a model of precision, in part due to its circular
aspect, it defines the minimum content of the term "branch"; by use of the word "in-
clude" the definition suggests a calculated indefiniteness with respect to the outer lim-
its of the term. However, the term "branch bank" at the very least includes any place
for receiving deposits or paying checks or lending money apart from the chartered
premises; it may include more.
Plant City, 396 U.S. at 135 (emphasis in original). Numerous cases have cited this quote as
support for a holding that a bank's activities constitute branch banking. See, e.g., Indepen-
dent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862
(1976); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller, 577 F. Supp. 252, 259 (D.D.C. 1983); Illinois
ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental m. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167, 1172 (N.D. Ill.
1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871
(1976).
29. Plant City, 396 U.S. at 137.
30. Id. The dissents in Plant City criticized the lack of deference shown to the Comp-
troller of the Currency, who as the supervisory agent for administering § 36, had determined
earlier that armored car messenger services did not constitute branch banking. Id. at 140-41
(Douglas, J. and Stewart, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 548
F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1976) (trust services), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977); Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Comptroller, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983) (discount brokerage services); see also
infra notes 47-55 and 63-69 and accompanying text.
32. See 1 FED. BANKING L. RaP. (CCH) 1 3106 (July 19, 1985).
33. See id. The following states permit state-wide branch banking- Alaska, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, New
Jersey, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
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branch banking on a limited basis; 34 and eight states prohibit
branching altogether.35 In states that allow branch banking, the
general substantive standard that the state superintendents (or the
Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a national bank branch)
must apply in reviewing a bank's application to open a branch is a
"convenience and needs" test.36 Before a state superintendent or
the Comptroller of the Currency will approve a bank's application
to operate a branch office, the bank must satisfy the appropriate
agency that the establishment of a bank branch, otherwise allowed
under state law, is feasible economically and serves public conve-
nience and necessity.3 7
State laws vary in their treatment of ATMs.3 8 In all, forty
states have enacted laws that deal with ATMs and their use within
the state. 9 Six states define ATMs as branches, 40 while thirty-four
34. These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin.
35. See 1 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 3106 (July 19, 1985). The following state
statutes prohibit branching: CoLo. REv. STAT. § 11-6-101 (Supp. 1984); Ill. Banking Act, § 6,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 313 (Smith-Hurd 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111 (1982); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 48.34 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 362.105(1) (Supp. 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 32-1-372 (1983); Nn. RaV. STAT. § 8-157 (1983); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903
(Vernon Supp. 1985).
36. See, e.g., AR. STAT. ANN. § 67-360 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REv. STAT. § 287.180 (1981);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-5-2 (1978).
37. See, e.g., ARu STAT. ANN. § 67-360 (Supp. 1983) (establishment of branch must be
economically feasible and serve public convenience and necessity); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-1-13
(1982) (public convenience and advantage); W. VA. CODE § 31A-8-12(j)(1) (Supp. 1985)
(same).
Many states also apply a capital and surplus requirement for each branch. See, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 28-2-13-19 (Burns Supp. 1985) (one branch for each $200,000 of unimpaired
capital and surplus); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1105.02(B)(2) (Page 1968) (additional capital,
surplus, and undivided profits to aggregate not less than $100,000 for each branch); VA.
CODE § 6.1-39 (1983) (authorizing branch if bank has unimpaired capital and surplus in
amount deemed necessary to warrant additional expansion).
38. See supra note 8 for the definition of an ATM.
39. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-367 (1980); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 550-559 (West Supp. 1985);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6.5-104 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-193a to -193h
(West 1981 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 770(c) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 658.65 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-203.2 (Harrison Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 403-53 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 26-309 (Supp. 1985); Electronic Fund Transfer Trans-
mission Facility Act, §§ 1-100 to 14-100, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, §§ 1301-1360 (Smith-Hurd
1981 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-2-13-4 (Burns Supp. 1985); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 527.1-.12 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-
B, §§ 131, 334, 339 (1964 & Supp. 1985); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-502 (1980 & Supp.
1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167B, §§ 1-24 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985); MICH. CoMP'.
LAWS ANN. §§ 488.1-488.31 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47.61-.75 (West Supp.
1985); MIss. CODE ANN. § 81-5-100 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.107 (Vernon Supp.
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states give ATMs special treatment or provide that the terminals,
whether individually owned or utilized in shared systems, are not
branches of the banks that establish or use them.41 Sharing off-
premises terminals among banks located in the state is mandatory
1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-6-102 to -103, 36-6-201 to -204 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-
157 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384-B:7 (1983 & Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:9A-1,
:9A-20 (West 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-16-5 to -16-18 (1978); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105-a
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-62 (1982 & Supp. 1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 6-03-02 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1111.03 (Page Supp. 1984);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 422 (West 1984); O& REV. STAT. §§ 714.210, .230, .250 (1983); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 19-29-1 (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 51-20A-1 to -20A-7 (1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-104, -308 (1980 & Supp. 1985); TE. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903a
(Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-16-2 to -16-19 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 6.1-
39.1, -39.2 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 30.43.010 to -.045 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE
§ 31A-8-12b (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 221.04 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). Alabama
does not have a statute that expressly addresses ATMs, but state regulations allow for re-
mote service units (RSUs), EFT systems, POS terminals, and ATMs. The regulations do not
characterize these facilities as bank branches; rather, the regulations treat these facilities as
extensions of existing banks. See Comment, A Survey of The State Laws Governing
Branching and Other Modes of Bank Expansion in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1079 (1981).
40. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 770(c) (Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B,
§ 334 (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-1 (West 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-16 (1983) (POS
terminals are not branches as per § 58-26-7); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1111.03 (Page Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 6.1-39.1 (1983). Louisiana does not have a statute that concerns the oper-
ation of ATMs, but an Attorney General opinion states that the use of ATM sites to make
cash advances does constitute the use of a branch bank, even when another bank owns the
ATM. See Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-579, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 98,096 (Sept. 10, 1979).
41. CAL. FIN. CODE § 550(a) (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6.5-102 (Supp.
1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-193d (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.65(8) (West
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-203.2(a) (Harrison Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 403-53
(Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 26-309 (Supp. 1985); Ill. Banking Act, § 2, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
17, § 302 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-2-13-7 (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 524.1212 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111(f) (Supp. 1984); MD. FIN.
INST. CODE ANN. § 5-502(f) (1980); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167B, § 1 (West 1984 & Supp.
1985); MICH ComP. LAWS ANN. § 488.10 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.61 (West
Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 81-5-100 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.107 (Vernon
Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-372(3)(a) (1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-157(3) (1983);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 384-B:2, :7 (Supp. 1983); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105-a (McKinney
Supp. 1984) (New York has home office protection and if a proposed ATM will be installed
in a city or town with a population of less than 50,000 and the city or town already supports
a principal office of a bank, then an ATM is deemed to be a branch and thus prohibited);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-62(c), (dl) (1982 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02(8) (Supp.
1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 422(C) (West 1984); OB. REV. STAT. § 706.005 (1983); RI.
GEN. LAWS § 19-29-1 (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-20A-5 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 45-3-104 (1980 & Supp. 1985); (branch office as defined does not include EFTs or RSUs,
but § 45-3-308 provides that an association may install RSUs only in those counties in
which the association may establish a branch); TEx STAT. ANN. art. 342-903a (Vernon Supp.
1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.43.010 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 31A-8-12b(2) (Supp.
1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 221.04(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-1985). By regulation, Alabama
and Kentucky treat ATMs as nonbranches. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1076.
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in twenty-four states, and permissive in ten.42 Only Wyoming is
silent on the issue of branch banking.
43
The banking system has experienced tremendous growth over
the last ten to fifteen years in the use of EFT systems.44 Banks
have recognized the potential for expansion in their customer bases
by offering twenty-four hour service and more convenient loca-
tions. Consequently, banks have installed ATMs on the premises
of their principal offices and later installed the terminals in shop-
ping centers, supermarkets, and other public locations. Customer
confidence and use has increased as the unmanned teller facilities
have become more common and more reliable.
42. For the states that mandate the sharing of ATMs, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-367.2
(1980) (within county); COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-6.5-104 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-193c (West & Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.65(4)-(5) (West 1984) (mandatory
sharing for POS terminal if owned by bank; permissive sharing of remote service terminal);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 403-53 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 26-309(2) (Supp. 1985); Ill. Banking
Act, § 5(16)(g), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 311(16)(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 527.5 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111(g) (Supp. 1984); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9-B, § 334(4) (Supp. 1985); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 488.10(3) (West Supp. 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.64 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-6-203(1) (1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 8-157(3) (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 384-B:7 (Supp. 1983); NJ). CENT. CODE
§ 6-03-02(8) (Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 422(D) (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 714.230 (1983); S.D. CODIF D LAWS ANN. § 51-20A-3 (1980); Tx REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
342-903a(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985); WASH. RE V. CODE ANN. § 30.43.030 (Supp. 1986); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 221.04(1)(k) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). The following state statutes provide for
permissive sharing of off-premises ATMs: CAL. FIN. CODE § 559 (West Supp. 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 770(c) (Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-203.2(b)(4) (Harrison Supp.
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-2-13-22 (Burns Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 167B, § 3
(West 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-20(D) (West 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-16-6(D)
(1983) (permissive sharing with an institution that has no office in the county); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 19-29-1(a) (1982); VA. CODE 6.1-39.1 (1983).
Mandatory sharing abates the concern that banks and nonfinancial institutions may
violate antitrust laws by restricting use of electronic transfer systems to one or only a few
banks. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 722 (citing "EFT in the United States: Policy Rec-
ommendations and the Public Interest," The Final Report of the National Commission on
Electronic Fund Transfers (Oct. 28, 1977), which considered four sharing policies in light of
federal antitrust law). The article also discusses balancing the benefits of shared EFT sys-
tems against the potential competitive harms that may result from sharing. See Goldberg,
supra note 10, at 728-29.
43. See 1 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 3106 (July 19, 1985).
44. See generally N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 8, 1 1.01[4] (history of develop-
ment of EFT systems). The authors discuss the reasons for offering ATMs in 6.04[2],
listing competition, cost savings, and marketing as the major driving forces. In 1978 Con-
gress passed the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982), which deals
with the mechanics of electronic transactions, liability of financial institutions, compulsory
use of electronic transfers, and the relation of these concerns to state laws. Nonfinancial
institutions offering electronic transfer services also are subject to the provisions of the Act.
The EFT Act was a congressional response to the rapid, uncontrolled, and uneven growth of
EFT systems and an attempt to set consistent standards for all institutions and corpora-
tions utilizing and offering electronic services.
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Along with this developing technology, however, has grown a
new set of obstacles. Banks that used these banking facilities en-
countered opposition not only from other banks that lacked availa-
ble capital to establish the same number of ATMs and CBCTs, but
also from courts and legislatures originally unwilling to find excep-
tions to prohibitive state branching laws.45 Prior to the 1976 Inde-
pendent Bankers Association v. Smith46 decision, district courts
varied in their conclusions as to whether the McFadden Act gov-
erned national banks' use of off-premises EFT systems. In Inde-
pendent Bankers v. Camp47 a district court held that although au-
tomated teller machines do not fit easily within the meaning of 12
U.S.C. § 36(c) 48 or applicable state law,49 a national bank could not
install automated teller branches in the absence of explicit statu-
tory permission.50 Similarly, the court in Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v.
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. 1 held that sec-
tion 36 of the Act does not permit national banks to maintain un-
manned CBCTs. Continental operated two unmanned CBCTs in
the Chicago area where its customers could make withdrawals, de-
posits, transfers, and loan and credit card payments.2 The bank
had opened the CBCTs after the Comptroller had issued an inter-
pretive ruling in 1975 in which he concluded that CBCTs were not
"offices within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)" of the banks that
owned and operated them.5" The Comptroller stated that "even if
45. See N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 8, 1 6.04[3][d]; see also Independent Bank-
ers v. Camp, 357 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (D. Or. 1973) (opposition to applications for two auto-
mated tellers on basis that they would be cheap way for bank to preempt valuable branch
location). See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 363 (discussing case law surrounding 12
C.F.R. § 7.7491); infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text, which also discuss case law sur-
rounding 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491.
46. 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
47. 357 F. Supp. 1352 (D. Or. 1973).
48. See supra note 5.
49. 1953 Or. Laws ch. 150, § 7 (repealed by 1973 Or. Laws ch. 797, § 428) (Oa. REV.
STAT. § 714.020).
50. Independent Bankers v. Camp, 357 F. Supp. at 1357. The court noted in particular
that the automated tellers would not promote public convenience and advantage, a require-
ment for any branch under OR REv. STAT. § 707.080(f), because only the establishing bank's
customers and the holders of specially coded Bankamericards would be able to use the
machines.
51. 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 536 F.2d 176
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
52. Id. at 1168-69.
53. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975); see Lignoul, 409 F. Supp. at 1170. According to the
Comptroller, because bank customers could not consummate some of the normal banking
transactions at a CBCT (i.e., opening an account, applying for a loan, obtaining money or-
ders), the CBCT did not meet the definition of a branch bank. The Comptroller character-
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a CBCT is considered to be a branch office, branch agency, or
branch place of business, it is not receiving deposits, paying
checks, or making loans within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)."'
Despite this ruling, the LignouI court decided that the operation of
the CBCTs in question constituted branch banking and, therefore,
was prohibited under section 36(c). 55
The court in Oklahoma ex rel. State Banking Board v. Bank
of Oklahoma,56 giving deference to the Comptroller's 1975 ruling,57
held that a CBCT that a bank operated in a parking lot and a POS
terminal 58 that the same bank used in a retail clothing store did
not violate either subsections 36(c) and (f) of the National Bank
ized CBCTs as instruments through which customers could communicate with their banks,
similar to mailboxes and telephones. See Lignoul, 409 F. Supp. at 1172-73; see also N. PEN-
NEY & D. BAKER, supra note 8, 22.01[1][b].
54. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975).
55. Lignoul, 409 F. Supp. at 1174-75. In reaching this decision, the court relied on
three earlier district court decisions. See Missouri ex. rel. Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, 405
F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941
(1976) (machines that performed same functions as those in instant case constituted branch
banking under 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)); Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207
(D.D.C. 1975) (Comptroller's ruling violated National Bank Act and thus void; legislative
history of § 36(f) clearly included CBCTs within definition of branch), aff'd, 534 F.2d 921
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); Colorado ex rel. State Banking Board v. First
Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975) (because machine accepted deposits, it was
prohibited branch), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
56. 409 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Okla. 1975). The court in Lignoul also relied on the Su-
preme Court's analysis in First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969),
in which the Court concluded that offering an additional location for taking deposits and
making withdrawals gave a national bank an advantage over state banks, exactly the type of
advantage Congress designed the McFadden Act to prevent. According to the Plant City
Court, notwithstanding the bank's policy of verification and its contractual arrangements
with its customers, the physical receipt of deposits and withdrawals constituted branch
banking in violation of state law. Id. at 136-37. The district court in Lignoul held that the
withdrawals were not the equivalent of cashing checks within the meaning of § 36(c), but
the Seventh Circuit reversed that portion of the holding, relying on Independent Bankers
Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976), in which the
court held that all functions performed by a CBCT constituted branch banking. See
Lignoul, 409 F. Supp. at 1175-78.
57. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975). In its conclusion, the court asserted that "administrative
interpretation, as expressed in the Comptroller's Interpretative Ruling 7.7491, as amended,
should be given substantial weight in its construction of the McFadden Act." State Banking
Bd. v. Bank of Okla., 409 F. Supp. at 90.
58. Utica National Bank, a codefendant, owned and operated two manned CBCTs in
retail stores. These POS units were connected directly to Utica's banking computer. A cus-
tomer could make withdrawals from his or her checking account to purchase merchandise at
the retail store or for any other purpose, and also could make deposits to the checking
account. State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Okla., 409 F. Supp. at 78-79. See supra note 10 for
definition of POS terminal.
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Act or Oklahoma banking laws. 59 Noting that CBCTs were not
within the contemplation of the drafters of the McFadden Act, the
court analogized CBCTs to mailboxes and telephones used in
banking.60 The court concluded that because the CBCT deposits
and withdrawals took place at the main office and not at the termi-
nals and because the clothing store maintained complete dominion
and control over the POS terminal, the machines constituted re-
ceptacles for bank transactions61 and, therefore, were not bank
branches.62
The Comptroller's interpretive ruling, however, was shortlived.
In Independent Bankers Association v. Smith,"' after two other
district courts had questioned the ruling's validity,6 4 the District
Court for the District of Columbia overruled the Comptroller's rul-
ing and enjoined its further implementation. 5 On appeal, the
59. Oklahoma's relevant statutes were OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§ 415, 501, 1001, 2061
(1971). Oklahoma amended §§ 415 and 501 in 1983 to provide for branch banking. The
legislature repealed § 2061.
60. State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Okla., 409 F. Supp. at 84.
61. Id. at 82.
62. Id. at 92. The court stated:
If banks are not permitted to change with the times and meet their customers' needs at
the lowest cost, the ultimate loser will be the consumer, who will be forced to bear the
increased costs of inefficient operation. A further loser will be commercial banks as a
class, which will be denied the right to compete on an equal basis with thrift institu-
tions that have free access to EFTS. Competition is the genius behind the American
experience, and competitive equality is the policy which underlies the branching provi-
sions of the McFadden Act .... To give the McFadden Act a restrictive meaning and
deny to commercial banks the use of the pro-competitive, efficient, and cost-saving
EFTS would actually be at odds with the purpose and intent of the McFadden Act.
Id. at 89-90.
63. 402 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 862 (1976).
64. See Missouri ex. rel. Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, 405 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo.
1975), afl'd, 538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Colorado ex rel. State
Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
65. 402 F. Supp. at 210. The traditional standard of review for determinations of the
Comptroller was whether the Comptroller's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142
(1973); see also City Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 513 F.2d 479, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court
could decide purely legal issues in a de novo fashion, but the courts could overturn the
Comptroller's factual determinations only if no rational basis existed for the decision. The
district court in Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith did not defer to the Comptroller's
ruling. The district court decision reflected a disregard both for the studies and research
that preceded the Comptroller's ruling, which indicated that the use of CBCTs did not de-
feat the intent and purpose of § 36, and the Comptroller's intention to monitor the develop-
ing electronic banking technology in light of his ruling. Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae, The Con-
sumer Bankers Ass'n and The Cal. Bankers Clearing House Ass'n at 12-13, Independent
Bankers Ass'n v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985) ("If ... the court
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed the lower court decision and held that CBCTs did consti-
tute branches under the National Bank Act because CBCTs per-
formed at least one of the traditional banking services of receiving
deposits, paying checks, and lending money.6 The court noted
that banks owning CBCTs must now (1) obtain approval from the
Comptroller and (2) comply with capital and surplus requirements
under both the National Bank Act6 7 and state banking statutes.
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute. . . .Rather,. . . the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a [reasonable] construction of the stat-
ute.") (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778,
2782 (1984)); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller, 577 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D.D.C. 1983)
(deference is owed to the Comptroller because of the scope of his authority, knowledge, and
application of undefined statutory terms to particular facts). As part of the banking deregu-
lation trend, Congress recently narrowed the Comptroller's discretionary sphere by enacting
12 U.S.C. § 93a (1982), which prohibits the Comptroller from prescribing rules and regula-
tions under § 36.
66. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d at 930. Legislative history of the
McFadden Act revealed that a structure might be defined as a branch even if a customer
could perform none of the three traditional banking services. Representative McFadden de-
scribed the scope of § 36(f) as "[a]ny place outside of or away from the main office where
the bank carries on its business of receiving deposits, paying checks, lending money, or
transacting any business carried on at the main office .... ." 68 CONG. REc. 5816 (1927).
Acting in reliance on this legislative history, the court in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comp-
troller, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983), held that a bank that offered discount brokerage
services at nonbranch offices had engaged in branch banking subject to state law restric-
tions. See also St. Louis County Nat'1 Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 548 F.2d
716, 719 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977), in which the court held that a
trust office opened by a national bank constituted branch banking, because the services of-
fered at the office were indicia of branch banking in the same manner as the three tradi-
tional banking functions. The dissent in Mercantile Trust argued that if Congress had in-
tended to include a trust office in its definition of a branch for the purposes of the
McFadden Act, it would have done so specifically, given that trust departments were an
integral part of the banking business in 1927. See Mercantile Trust, 548 F.2d at 721 (Hen-
ley, J., dissenting). These cases illustrate the problem of utilizing a narrow reading of § 36(f)
of the McFadden Act. If state banks do not engage in trust services or discount brokerage
activities, then the competitive equality policy will not be furthered under these holdings.
To the contrary, national banks will not be able to engage in certain aspects of the banking
business in some states simply because the state banks have chosen not to participate or are
prohibited by state law, while in other states national and state banks may enjoy such free-
doms. To call these offices branches does not fulfill the intent and purpose of the McFadden
Act.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 36(d) (1982) provides that "[tihe aggregate capital of every national
banking association and its branches shall at no time be less than the aggregate minimum
capital required by law for the establishment of an equal number of national banking as-
sociations situated in the various places where such association and its branches are
situated."
Section 51 states that:
[N]o national banking association shall be organized with a capital of less than
$100,000 .... No such association shall be organized in a city the population of which
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Although the court felt that the classification of CBCTs as non-
branches might be accurate, the court held that the Comptroller's
ruling overreached its authority and could not stand because it
preempted state law that prohibited off-premises terminals.68
Although prohibiting the national bank from using the EFT
system, the language of the Smith court ironically has become the
basis both for the establishment of shared or interchange ATM
networks and for the membership of national banks in those net-
works. In criticizing the Comptroller's attempt to analogize ATM
services to banking by mail or telephone, the court stated that the
analogy failed "because, in the case of a mailbox or a telephone, no
place or facility established (i.e., owned or rented) by a bank is
involved. '69 The Comptroller issued a new ruling in 1982 that in-
corporated the Smith establishment criterion"° and articulated the
Comptroller's general policy of approving CBCT applications that
do not violate applicable federal and state law.7 1
B. Shared ATM Networks
Courts addressing the legality of EFT systems have rested
their decisions on the functions performed by the computer termi-
nals, 2 the ownership or rental by the national banks of the ATMs
and CBCTs, 7 and the underlying policy of competitive equality.74
exceeds fifty thousand persons with a capital of less than $200,000 .... No such asso-
ciation shall hereafter be authorized to commence the business of banking until it shall
have a paid-in surplus equal to 20 per centun of its capital.
12 U.S.C. § 51 (1982).
68. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d at 932.
69. Id. at 941 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). According to the court, a broad
definition of branch would serve two purposes: first, it would confirm state preeminence in
branch banking decisions and, second, it would guarantee the flexibility necessary to apply
and adapt a 1927 statute to computer technology in the banking field. Id. at 943.
70. 12 C.F.R. § 5.31 (1982); see supra note 9 for the Comptroller of the Currency's
definition of a CBCT.
71. 12 C.F.R. at § 5.31(c)(1); see also Bank of North Shore v. FDIC, 743 F.2d 1178
(7th Cir. 1984) (two shared ATMA approved by federal banking agencies in reliance on 12
C.F.R. § 5.31).
72. See, e.g., Colorado ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 540 F.2d 497
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977); Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith,
534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Conti-
nental Mll. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Iln. 1975), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976); Oklahoma ex rel.
State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Okla., 409 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
73. See Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d at 921.
74. See generally Colorado ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 540 F.2d 497
(10th Cir. 1976) (broad meaning given to § 36(f) so as to place national and state banks in a
position of competitive equality), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977); Independent Bankers
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The initiation of regional and national shared ATM systems has
made the struggle over how to treat ATMS under the McFadden
Act even more difficult and confusing.75 Relying on Independent
Bankers Association v. Smith 7  and a Comptroller's ruling issued
pursuant to this decision,7 7 national and state banks and other fi-
nancial and nonfinancial institutions have formed eight national 8
and approximately two hundred regional ATM systems.79 In an in-
terstate ATM network, individual members of participating insti-
tutions, subsidiary ATM systems, or nonfinancial institutions own
the terminals. If a national or state bank owns the terminal, the
ATM must, under both federal law and the branching law of the
state in which the bank's principal office is located, have qualified
as a branch of the bank that established the terminal.8 0 The cus-
tomers of each member institution may utilize an ATM of any
other member in any locality, and the customers may have access
to their accounts simply by inserting a plastic card in the terminal
Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 936 n.62 (D.C. Cir.) (reviewing doctrine of competitive equal-
ity), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 536 F.2d 176
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976); Independent Bankers v. Camp, 357 F. Supp.
1352 (D. Or. 1973); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 292 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (armored
car messenger service at issue).
75. Four different financial institution-sharing arrangements exist: the shared, in-
terchange, piggy-back, and single-institution systems. In a shared system, a group of institu-
tions mutually installs and operates the terminals. In an interchange system, separate insti-
tutions or shared systems contribute an ATM and allow the customers of other member
institutions to use the machines. The institution whose customer utilizes the ATM pays the
establishing institution an interchange fee or transaction fee. The piggy-backing system is a
simpler version of the interchange system, in that one institution allows customers of other
banks to use the institution's ATMs. Under the single-institution system, only the custom-
ers of the establishing institution have access to the terminal. N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra
note 8, % 6.02[5].
76. 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
77. 12 C.F.R. § 5.31 (1985). The Comptroller's ruling, which adopted the "establish-
ment criteria" of the Smith decision, indicated that a national bank does not violate the
McFadden Act by using an ATM the bank does not own or operate.
78. See Status of ATM's Under State Branching Laws: Hearings on S. 2898 Before
the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1984) (state-
ment of Roland E. Brandel, member, Consumer Bankers Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as S.
Hearings]. National ATM networks include: Cirrus (43 states), Citishare (15 states), The
Exchange (33 states), Express Cash (27 states), MasterTeller (5 states), Nationet (10 states),
Plus (47 states), and Visa (9 states). See No Shakeout Yet for ATM Systems, 3 BANKING
EXPANSION REP. 2, 3 (Sept. 17, 1984).
79. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 195 n.26 (Brief of Amicus Curiae, Mastercard
International, Inc. at 17, Marine Midland Bank) (listing the ten largest regional ATM sys-
tems and their locations)).
80. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 11 (statement on behalf of Plus System, Inc.).
1636 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1621
and keying in a personal identification number.8 Withdrawals, ac-
count transfers, and balance inquiries are the typical transactions
that a shared ATM will perform; certain state laws, however, for-
bid deposit-taking in an effort to encourage investing money in the
local community.82 In August 1983, shared networks utilized over
16,000 of the 40,000 ATMs in the United States,8 3 and more than
one-half of the commercial banks belonged to these shared
-networks."
An institution typically receives a transaction fee each time a
customer of another member bank uses the institution's ATM. 5
These fees assist the ATM-owning institutions in defraying the
81. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 145 (statement of Mary-Pat Cottrell, Vice-
Pres., City-Trust and Chairman, Electronic Funds Transfer Ass'n). Membership in shared
ATM networks incudes both state and national financial institutions and is not restricted to
commercial banks. See id. at 142. Most state laws govern only state and national financial
institutions; therefore, a nonfinancial institution theoretically would not be subject to state
branching restrictions and requirements. See N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 8,
23.02[2]; see also Interpretive Letter No. 160 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING
L. REP. (CCH) 85,241 (1980) (three correspondent banks permitted to form bank service
corporation to operate EFT network but warned to avoid antitrust problems and to share
terminals on nondiscriminatory basis; this operation would not constitute branch banking).
82. S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 9 (statement on behalf of Plus System, Inc.); see,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.65(9) (West Supp. 1984); Electronic Fund Transfer Transmission
Facility Act, § 6-104, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 1331 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (state statutes
prohibiting deposits to out-of-state banks); see also S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 75 (state-
ment of Roland E. Brandel, member, Consumer Bankers Ass'n, recommending removal of
language in proposed amendment to § 36 to alleviate concerns of state banks that federal
law might preempt state law and allow deposit-taking when state law prohibits the activity
at shared ATMs). In an interpretive letter, however, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) responded to an inquiry whether the interstate use of CBCTs by national
banks when the CBCT located in another state accepted deposits for the bank, constituted
prohibited interstate branch banking. The OCC staff responded that because the bank uti-
lized the CBCT on a transactional fee basis, its use would not constitute branch banking
and would not upset the balance of competitive equality in the other state. See Interpretive
Letter No. 153 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,234 (July 7,
1980).
83. S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 11 (statement on behalf of Plus System, Inc.). There
are approximately 50 million ATM access cards useable in shared networks. Id. at 11-12.
84. Id. at 12.
85. The legal division of the OCC stated in a 1981 interpretive letter that the payment
of transaction fees by a national bank would be permissible as long as the fee did not resem-
ble a rental payment. The letter discussed a sponsorship arrangement whereby Bank A, the
owner of the CBCT, made the system available to other banks and charged "rental fees"
based on asset size. The contract between the banks entitled Bank B to have its name at the
top of the list of participating institutions and receive a fee for transactions by customers of
other banks. The OCC declared that this arrangement constituted branch banking because
Bank B's utilization of the CBCT evidenced a certain degree of control over the CBCT and
a stake in its success and was more analogous to the "establishment" criteria in 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.31 (1982). Interpretive Letter No. 188 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L.
REP. (CCH) 85,269 (May 12, 1981).
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costs of establishing an ATM. At the same time, smaller banks
benefit by (1) being able to provide more convenient banking ser-
vices to their customers and (2) being able to compete with larger
institutions for customers in a broader market area.8 6 Transaction
fees arguably constitute rental of an ATM and, under the Smith87
analysis, the ATM that a bank's customer uses would be a branch
of that bank and would have to meet federal and state branching
laws.88
Some states already have confronted the problem of how to
deal with developing technology and shared ATM networks. Fif-
teen jurisdictions allow some form of interstate utilization of
ATMs in interchange systems8" while five states expressly prohibit
interstate exchange networks.9 State laws generally promote the
use of EFT systems on an intrastate basis and many states specifi-
cally include national banks in their treatment of off-premises
electronic facilities.91
86. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 146, 158 (statements of Mary-Pat Cottrell,
Vice-President, City-Trust, and Chairman, Electronic Funds Transfer Ass'n, and John C.
Elliott, Exec. Vice-Pres. Mastercard Int'l, Inc.).
87. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 862 (1976).
88. A strong counterargument is that a transaction fee does not give the bank respon-
sibility and control over an ATM. It would be unreasonable, therefore, to treat the shared
ATM as a branch with status equal to a "brick and mortar" branch. See S. Hearings, supra
note 78, at 166 (statement of John C. Elliott, Exec. Vice-Pres., Mastercard Int'l, Inc.).
89. See ALA. CODE § 5-2A-7(b) (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-367.4 (1980); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36-193b (West Supp. 1985) (allowing in-state banks to use out-of-state termi-
nals on transaction fee basis while not allowing out-of-state banks to use in-state terminals);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 770(c) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.65(9) (West 1984); Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Transmission Facility Act, § 6-104, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 1331
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 12-207 (1980) (allowing foreign banks
to have electronic terminals in the state for limited purposes); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
167B, § 3 (West 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.64 (West Supp. 1985) (limited purposes); OR.
REv. STAT. § 714.250 (1983) (reciprocal privileges); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-20A-7
(1980) (permitting customers of foreign banks to use in-state RSU with consent of local
bank maintaining or using same unit); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-16-9 (1982); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 30.43.020, .045 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 31A-8-12b (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 221.04(1) (West 1982) (permissive sharing with out-of-state banks).
90. The following states prohibit interstate networks: Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Mon-
tana, and New Jersey.
91. States that specifically include national banks under their EFT laws include: Ala-
bama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi (with OCC approval), Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
Separate statutes govern savings and loan associations, and state branching restrictions
do not constrain federal savings and loans. See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1982) (amending § 5(b)(1) of the Home Owners' Loan
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
A. Independent Bankers Association v. Marine Midland Bank
In Independent Bankers Association v. Marine Midland
Bank92 the District Court for the Western District of New York
considered whether Marine Midland Bank had engaged in branch
banking in violation of section 36 of the McFadden Act s and New
'York's home office protection law94 by using an ATM that
Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. had installed at its supermarket in
Canandaigua, New York. Wegmans had contracted with Marine to
become a member of the HarMoney network. 5 The HarMoney
network at that time consisted of one nonfinancial institution,
Wegmans, and eight financial institutions.9 e The network linked
each member's computer to a central computer system, known as
the "Switch," which permitted customers of each institution to
utilize the ATMs of fellow members.9 7 Wegmans retained owner-
ship and control of the ATM, but Marine owned the Switch.9 8 The
Act of 1933). According to this Act, "Notwithstanding any limitation of this section, associa-
tions may establish remote service units for the purpose of crediting savings or demand
accounts, debiting such accounts, crediting payments on loans, and the disposition of related
financial transactions, as provided in regulations prescribed by the Board." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(b)(1)(F) (1982)). Similarly, federal savings and loan associations may establish,
use, and otherwise participate in RSUs on an unrestricted geographical basis. 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.4-2(c) (1982); see also Oklahoma ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Okla., 409 F.
Supp. 71, 85 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (permitting thrift institutions' point-of-sale terminals every-
where in the United States). See generally Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d
921, 935 n.59 (D.C. Cir.) (discussion of disparity in treatment between national banks, sav-
ings and loans, and credit unions), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
92. 583 F. Supp. 1042 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985).
93. See supra note 5.
94. According to a 1980 census, Canandaigua has a population of approximately
10,419. See Joint Appendix at 19, Affidavit of George W. Hamlin, IV, Marine Midland
Bank, 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985). Canandaigua thus qualified for inclusion under New
York's home office protection laws. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105(1) (1971) (amended by
1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 380, § 8 (effective Jan. 1, 1976)). Canandaigua National Bank & Trust
Co. maintained its principal place of business in Canandaigua.
95. Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. at 1044.
96. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 2-3, Marine Midland Bank.
97. Wegmans also made its ATMs available to any interested financial institutions. In
addition to HarMoney, Wegmans contracted with MetroTeller, another shared ATM net-
work. Member institutions of both networks could issue access cards to their customers for
the Wegmans ATM. HarMoney's members were: Elmira Savings Bank, First National Bank
of Rochester, Griflis-Oneida Federal Credit Union, Manufacturers Hanover, N.A., Marine
Midland Bank, N.A., The National Bank of Geneva, Salamanca Trust Co., and SeaComm
Federal Credit Union. The MetroTeller Network consisted of 45 financial institutions. See
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 2-3, Marine Midland Bank.
98. Marine Midland Bank's ownership of the switch was somewhat unusual in a
shared ATM network. Bank service corporations, data processing companies, and other non-
SHARED ATMs
customers of each HarMoney member could access their accounts
through Wegmans' ATM, and Wegmans then would receive a
transaction fee.99
The Marine Midland Bank court was the first court con-
fronted with a national bank's participation in an interchange
ATM network since the Independent Bankers Association v.
Smith'00 decision and the Comptroller's 1978 ruling, 10 1 which had
incorporated the Smith establishment criteria and had exempted
shared ATMs from branch treatment. Marine argued that the
Smith decision supported the position that ATMs are not branch
banks because the bank's activities did not meet the two-part test
developed in Smith.10 2 The Smith court held that to find that a
CBCT is a branch, (1) the national bank must have established the
terminal, and (2) the CBCT must offer a convenience that gives
the bank a competitive advantage over other banks in the area.'
Smith had defined "established" as meaning "owned or rented,"
and Marine, like other national banks, had relied upon this test
and this definition in making its decision to participate in the in-
terchange ATM network.104 Marine pointed out that it did not own
or rent the terminal and that other banks also could utilize the
Wegmans ATM, thereby assuring that competitive equality still
existed.105 The district court rejected this argument and accused
Marine of asserting form over substance. The court held that
based on the services performed at the ATM, Marine had estab-
financial institutions often own the switching system the network uses. See id. at 6; see also
Interpretive Letter No. 160 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
85,241 (1980) (national banks allowed to form bank service corporations to operate EFT
network; these actions are within Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982)
and do not constitute branch banking).
99. The member institution whose customer utilized the ATM would pay the switch
owner a transaction fee and the switch owner would then pay a portion of the fee to the
owner of the ATM. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 4, Marine Midland Bank.
100. 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); see supra notes 63-71
and accompanying text.
101. 12 C.F.R. § 5.31 (1982).
102. Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. at 1046.
103. 534 F.2d at 951.
104. Id.; Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. at 1046.
105. Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. at 1046. The court rejected this argument
with little analysis and held Congress responsible for providing a remedy. Id. at 1048. See
also supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of ownership and control
criteria. See generally Peck & McMahon, Recent Federal Litigation Relating to Customer-
Bank Communication Terminals ("CBCTs") and the McFadden Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 1657,
1678 (1977) (discussing the significance of the "established" distinction as a mitigating fac-
tor in competitive disadvantage controversy).
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lished a branch equivalent to any "brick and mortar" branch.10
Marine also argued that it had complied with a recent regula-
tion that excluded from the section 36(f) definition of "branch"
those CBCTs that a national bank did not own or rent.10 7 The
court rejected this argument. Because the Comptroller had not
taken a long-standing and consistent position on the interpretation
of section 36, the court decided that the Comptroller's regulation
did not deserve substantial weight or deference. 0 8
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court deci-
sion. 10 9 In the court's attempt to resolve the issue, the Second Cir-
cuit first examined the statutory construction of 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
and (f) to determine the meaning of "establish and operate." The
court noted that "[a] rigid application of the language of [the]
1927 [McFadden Act] to the new technology fails to confront the
economic realities facing a court, and leads to anomalous re-
sults." 1" 0 The court, however, concluded that simply examining the
statute could not provide an answer and turned to both legislative
intent and the views of the Comptroller for guidance. Reiterating
the McFadden Act's policy of competitive equality, the court dis-
cussed how characterizing the ATM as a branch would affect banks
and independent banking associations and concluded that national
banks would be at a technological disadvantage if shared ATM us-
age constituted the "establishment" of a "branch" for federal law
purposes."'
Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit accorded great
weight to the Comptroller of the Currency's interpretive rulings
106. Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. at 1047. The court reviewed the legislative
history of the McFadden Act and earlier case law interpreting the term "branch" as used in
§ 36 of the Act. Id. at 1045. All appellate courts prior to the Smith decision had treated
ATMs as branches. See First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969)
(federal law controls definition of branch for national bank purposes); First Nat'l Bank v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966); Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534
F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. IMI. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976); Missouri ex rel. Kostman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 405 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Colorado ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F.
Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
107. See supra note 70.
108. Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. at 1046-47.
109. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 459.
111. Id. at 461; see also Hawke, 2nd Circuit Expands Powers of National Banks, Le-
gal Times, Mar. 18, 1985, at 18, col. 1 (decision clearly vindicates the OCC position).
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and regulations because the Comptroller is the executive agency
charged with enforcing the McFadden Act.112 Emphasizing the def-
erence owed to the Comptroller's views," 3 the court stated, "Fash-
ioning policies in response to events that were unforeseeable when
the legislation was written is one of the primary functions of exec-
utive agencies."1 4 The Second Circuit also noted as an important
consideration in its decision the substantial growth of shared ATM
networks, which resulted from reliance on Smith and subsequent
Comptroller rulings. Congress had remained silent in the wake of
both the Smith decision, which developed the "establishment" cri-
teria, and the Comptroller's regulation, 1 5 which incorporated the
language of Smith. The Second Circuit concluded that this silence
equalled acquiescence and held that absent legislative action,
shared ATMs would not constitute branches of the banks that uti-
lized their services within the meaning of subsections 36(c) and (f)
of the McFadden Act." 6
B. Banking Convenience Act of 1984
Congress reacted quickly to the district court decision in
Marine Midland Bank."7 In September 1984, the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held hearings on a
proposed amendment to the National Bank Act that effectively
112. See supra notes 57, 65 and accompanying text.
113. 757 F.2d at 461; see also supra note 65.
114. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d at 461.
115. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
116. See Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d at 462. The court refused to halt the mo-
mentum of electronic banking technology and commented that if the momentum should be
stopped "it should be done by Congress, and not by this court, particularly when the barrier
we are asked to impose would be based upon definitions framed over 50 years ago." Id.
117. Congress proposed the Banking Convenience Act of 1984, which would add the
following subsection (i) to § 36 of the McFadden Act:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or of a similar State law, a
national bank may share, or permit its customers to use, an automated device that is
not established by that bank, and such automated device shall not be considered a
branch of that bank within the meaning of subsection (f) of this section.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection-
(A) an automated device is established by a national bank only if it is owned or
rented by that bank;
(B) an automated device is not established by a national bank if the bank is as-
sessed transactional fees or similar charges for its use; and
(C) the term "automated device" includes, without limitation, automated teller
machines, customer bank communication terminals, point-of-sale terminals, and cash
dispensing machines.
S. 2898, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1984).
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would overrule the district court decision."" The sponsors of the
amendment119 explained that the purpose of the proposed legisla-
tion was to preserve and promote the ability of national banks to
participate in shared ATM networks and to protect the consumer
benefits of shared ATMs, which the district court decision in
Marine Midland Bank had jeopardized.120
The Senate hearings reflected a wide base of support for al-
lowing national bank participation in shared ATM systems. 2 1 Pro-
ponents of the legislation noted the need for federal legislation to
clarify for national banks, in the same manner that state legisla-
tion clarified for state banks, the position ATM networks hold in
the national banking system. 122 Proponents of the amendment ar-
gued that national banks currently experience a competitive disad-
vantage in many states. 123 State depository institutions may par-
ticipate in interchange ATM networks in most states, and federal
law places no restrictions on the interstate use of ATMs by feder-
ally-chartered savings and loan associations and credit unions. 124
Supporters of the bill also pointed out that the proposed amend-
ment would alleviate the problems that the district court's func-
tional definition of "branch" caused in Marine Midland Bank.125
According to the amendment's proponents, the Marine Midland
Bank rationale, when carried to its extreme, suggests that any re-
tail establishment honoring a bank credit card or cashing custom-
118. S. Hearings, supra note 78.
119. Senators Paul Trible (Va.) and Gordon J. Humphrey (N.H.) introduced the bill.
120. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 2 (statement of Sen. Trible).
121. See, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 8, 18, 56, 138 (statements by Plus Sys-
tem, Inc., Michael Mancusi, Roland E. Brandel, and Mary-Pat Cottrell).
122. See S. Hearings supra note 78, at 72, 113, 138, 159 (statements by Roland E.
Brandel, American Bankers Ass'n, Mary-Pat Cottrell, and John C. Elliott).
123. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 9, 18, 72, 138, 163 (statements by Plus System,
Inc., Michael A. Mancusi, Roland E. Brandel, Mary-Pat Cottrell, and John C. Elliott).
124. See supra note 92; see also S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 72-73 (statement of
Roland E. Brandel) (S. 2898 would resolve geographical inequities and remove the deploy-
ment restrictions on national banks that institutions such as Merrill-Lynch, Sears, and
Safeway are not required to follow). Congress has expressed an interest in ATMs and shared
ATM networks over the past 10 years. The International Banking Act of 1978, Electronic
Fund Transfer Act, and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 reflect the
receptive attitude that Congress has taken toward computer banking technology. Congress'
silence after the Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith decision and the Comptroller's ruling
based on Smith indicates its acquiescence in the course embarked upon by the banking
industry in the realm of shared ATM networks. See Brief for Amici Curiae, Consumer
Bankers Ass'n and Cal. Bankers Clearing House Ass'n at 27, Marine Midland Bank; see
also Goldberg, supra note 10, at 740-41.
125. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 66; Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. at
1047.
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ers' checks would constitute a bank branch. 126 All the supporters of
the amendment stressed that the millions of dollars invested in
these regional and national interchange ATM networks would be
wasted if the district court's Marine Midland Bank decision forced
national banks to withdraw their membership. 2 7 These advocates
urged Congress to pass the narrowly drafted amendment, which
varied little from the law in those states exempting ATMs from
the definition of branch, thereby putting national banks in an
equivalent position with state banks in all fifty states.'28
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Argument for a Public Policy Approach to ATM
Networks
The Second Circuit's public policy approach in Marine Mid-
land Bank temporarily averted a major crisis in the banking indus-
try. The district court decision in Marine Midland Bank effec-
tively would have prohibited national banks from participating in
interstate ATM networks because the banks then would be en-
gaged in illegal interstate branching. The district court, relying on
earlier case law and a strict interpretation of section 36 of the Mc-
Fadden Act, included within the definition of branch129 any ATM
at which a bank's customers could perform any banking transac-
126. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 66; see also Brief for Amici Curiae, Consumer
Bankers Ass'n and Cal. Bankers Clearing House Ass'n at 22, Marine Midland Bank (The
district court decision reflects the view that "a third party that provides financial services to
a consumer, which services in turn affect an account relationship with a bank, is merely
providing 'a vehicle for the bank and its customers to do business.' ").
127. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 6, 13, 20, 70, 138 (statements of Marine Mid-
land Bank, Plus System, Inc., Michael A. Mancusi, Roland E. Brandel, Mary-Pat Cottrell,
and John C. Elliott).
128. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text; see also S. Hearings, supra note
78, at 9, 18 (statements of Plus System, Inc., and Michael A. Mancusi) (bill would preserve
"status quo ante"). One article has noted that to exempt a CBCT from the definition of a
branch would not create any risk of concentrating monetary resources or promoting monop-
olistic control over community banking because a CBCT could not offer all the services of a
"brick and mortar" branch. See Comment, supra note 2, at 385.
Senators Paul S. Trible, Gordon J. Humphrey, and John P. East reintroduced the pro-
posed amendment in the 99th Congress as Senate Bill 206. The Senate then referred the
amendment to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on January
21, 1985. Representative John J. LaFalie introduced the amendment in the House of Repre-
sentatives as House Bill 688, and, on January 24, 1985, the House referred the amendment
to the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs.
129. Courts use federal law to determine what constitutes a branch of a national bank.
See supra text accompanying notes 22 and 26.
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tion.13° The appellate court, however, realized that it could not cat-
egorize the modern methods of performing banking transactions as
neatly in 1985 as a court could in 1927 and, therefore, following a
more modern and rational line of reasoning, the court excluded
shared ATMs from the federal definition of a branch.
13
'
State banks in at least fifteen states 3  participate in regional
or national interchange networks without violating state branch
banking laws because in these states the definition of a branch
bank does not include ATMs. Under the Second Circuit's Marine
Midland Bank decision, national banks also may participate in
shared networks at an interstate level without violating any state
laws. The district court decision would have reinstated the compet-
itive disadvantage that the McFadden Act sought to remove from
the dual banking system. The appellate court, however, recognized
that to label a shared ATM a branch of any national bank that
participates in an interstate network would limit the ability of na-
tional banks to compete in the area of developing banking technol-
ogy.1 3 3 The Second Circuit correctly noted that the district court
misinterpreted Smith and misapplied its establishment criteria.134
Smith had emphasized the requirement that a facility be "estab-
lished (i.e., owned or rented)," in order to constitute a branch.135
The Second Circuit correctly recognized that without the estab-
lishment criteria, the definition of branch would include any
method of communication with a bank.'3 6
The Second Circuit noted the significant consumer demand
for electronic banking,' 37 and the court's reversal of the lower court
decision avoided several adverse effects on consumers. First,
130. See Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. at 1047.
131. See Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d at 459.
132. See supra note 90.
133. See Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d at 460-61. Other financial institutions could
have continued their participation in the networks because the Marine Midland Bank deci-
sion had no legal effect on them. See also supra note 92; D. BAKER & R BRANDEL, THE LAW
OF ELECTRONmC FUND TRANSFER SYsTEss 6.02[5] (Supp. 1984) (geographic restrictions
lifted at national level on ATMs for federal savings and loan associations); Goldberg, supra
note 10, at 742-43 (banks suffer competitive disadvantage when compared to federally-
chartered savings and loan associations and federal credit unions).
134. See Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d at 462.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
136. See Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d at 462 (broad definition of branch theoreti-
cally could include accepted conveniences such as banking by mail and banking by tele-
phone). See Also supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of State Banking
Bd. v. Bank of Okla., in which the court also analogized CBCTs to banking by mail and by
telephone.
137. See Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d at 462.
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shared ATM networks provide many advantages for those individ-
uals who utilize the terminals.13 8 Customers no longer are forced to
bank during inconvenient banking hours; they enjoy twenty-four
hour availability for the most common transactions. Second, trav-
elers and vacationers do not have to carry large amounts of cash
with them; ATMs located in other states are available for their
needs. Third, smaller banks and other financial institutions actu-
ally achieve competitive equality with the larger institutions.
These smaller institutions now may offer their customers better
service and greater accessibility through the networks without hav-
ing to expend their own capital to construct and maintain several
ATMs.3 9 Fourth, location no longer plays a determinative role in
forming a customer base; instead, banks may promote their ser-
vices when attracting clients. Last, sharing ATMs avoids the possi-
ble monopolistic control that larger institutions could exert over
emerging computer banking technology. 140 The Marine Midland
Bank district court decision threatened to destroy these consumer
benefits because many of the larger national banks would have
been forced to withdraw from the shared networks. The smaller
banks then would have had to bear the financial burden of operat-
ing the interstate systems, and the customers ultimately would
have paid higher service fees attributed to the loss of the econo-
mies of scale.14 '
The Second Circuit's reasoning indicates a willingness to take
a public policy approach rather than to follow a strict interpreta-
tion of the McFadden Act. The Second Circuit's decision, however,
only temporarily preserves the development of electronic transfer
systems. Recent developments in other areas of banking lend fur-
ther support to the Second Circuit's approach in Marine Midland
Bank and cast doubt upon the reasoning used by courts previously
faced with the issue of whether to treat ATMs as branches. For
example, the Comptroller recently approved the establishment of
limited-service banks, popularly known as "nonbank banks," by
138. See, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 13 (statement on behalf of Plus System,
Inc.); N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 8, 6.04[2]; Goldberg, supra note 10, at 724.
139. Through their membership in interchange ATM networks, smaller banks avoid
passing the costs involved in owning an ATM on to their customers.
140. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 724-37 (discussion of federal antitrust laws and
sharing of EFT systems).
141. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 140 (statement of Mary-Pat Cottrell); Sczudlo,
The Marine Midland Decision and Shared ATM Systems, 3 BANKING EXPANsION REP. 1, 9-
10 (Oct. 15, 1984).
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Chase Manhattan Corporation.142 Nonbank banks are financial in-
stitutions that either accept demand deposits or make commercial
loans. By performing only one function, these institutions avoid
the Bank Holding Company Act's federal definition of a bank.'4 3
Thus, bank holding companies may participate in limited forms of
interstate banking.14 4 If limited-service banks may operate at the
interstate level, 145 then no logical reason exists for prohibiting na-
tional banks from participating in interstate ATM networks.
The court in Independent Bankers Association v. Smith
stated that CBCTs were branches "[b]ecause all CBCT's perform
one of the branch banking functions described in section 36(f).' ' 6
The weakness of the logic used by the district court in Marine
Midland Bank and in earlier case law endorsing a similar interpre-
tation is apparent when compared to current banking deregulation
trends 147 and the proposed limited-service banks. ATMs cannot
perform all banking services ' 4' and, therefore, do not pose any
greater threat to local banks than do the nonbank banks. Several
states prohibit deposit-taking or account transfers at ATMs in an
effort to keep community assets invested in the community. 4 9
Consumers still require staffed offices for many bank services, and
the placement of a computer terminal in a town several hundred
miles away from a bank's principal office or branch office does not
create insurmountable or unfair competition for the banks that do
142. See Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1985, at 2, col. 1.
143. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982) ("[B]ank" defined as
"any institution ... which (1) accepts deposits ... and (2) engages in the business of mak-
ing commercial loans.").
144. See supra note 143; see also 70 FED. REs. BuLL. 312, 318 (Apr. 1984) (statement
of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Gov'rs of Fed. Res. Sys.); id. at 298, 299 (statement by
Paul A. Volcker before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) (recom-
mending strengthened definition of "bank" in Bank Holding Company Act to close loophole
for "nonbank banks" and prevent undermining of congressional prohibition on interstate
banking).
145. In 1985 Chase Manhattan Corp. will open limited-service banks that make con-
sumer and commercial loans and offer money market acocunts and certificates of deposit in
five states.
146. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d at 928.
147. See North Carolina Regional Reciprocal Banking Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-209
to -218 (Supp. 1984) (reciprocal interstate banking); Tennessee Regional Reciprocal Bank-
ing Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-12-101 to -108 (Supp. 1985). See Comment, supra note 3, at
721-22, for a discussion of the possibility that modern commercial activities have rendered
the McFadden Act obsolete.
148. ATMs cannot open new accounts, dispense cashier's checks or money orders,
make loans without a pre-approved line of credit, or open certificates of deposit.
149. Florida, Illinois, and Maryland are a few of the states with restrictions that pro-
hibit ATMs from receiving deposits.
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maintain an office in the area.
B. The Argument for a Legislative Solution
The majority of the earlier judicial decisions that addressed
electronic banking issues accorded little importance to regulations
and rulings of the Comptroller.15 The Second Circuit's reasoning
in Marine Midland Bank, however, relied on a 1982 Comptroller's
ruling15 1 and assumed a more deferential stance toward the admin-
istrative agency. Although this deferential approach is the most
appropriate attitude for courts to adopt, nothing in the Marine
Midland Bank decision guarantees that future courts in other cir-
cuits will follow the lead of the Second Circuit. Case law reflects a
pattern of disregard for Comptroller interpretations in the elec-
tronic banking field, and the lower court decision is an example of
how courts may misapply the Smith establishment criteria155
150. See supra notes 55 and 63-68 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 56-62
for one district court's contrary position.
151. The court relied on 12 C.F.R. § 5.31 (1982). See supra note 9.
152. The Smith court emphasized the importance of a federal definition of "branch"
and pointed out that the "resolution of whether a CBCT is a branch for purposes of federal
law should be the same, for example, in California, which permits statewide branch banking,
as in Texas, whose constitution prohibits branching." Independent Banker's Ass'n v. Smith,
534 F.2d at 933 (quoting 39 Fed. Reg. 44418 (1974)). Although the Smith court used this
statement to find that CBCTs were branches of the national banks that established them,
the court's reasoning supports the Second Circuit's decision in Marine Midland Bank be-
cause no national bank established the ATM in question. The Smith court held that if a
state permitted state-chartered banks to establish CBCTs to receive deposits, pay checks, or
lend money, then national banks could establish CBCTs for the same purposes. Id. at 948.
More importantly, the court stated that the same rule would hold true even in a state that
prohibited branch banking but exempted CBCTs from the definition of "branch." The lower
court in Marine Midland Bank failed to consider this part of the Smith holding. Federal
law, according to the district court decision, defines CBCTs as branches. If a state does not
define a CBCT as a branch, state banks will be able to establish, operate, rent, and utilize
the terminals, yet the national banks will not be able to participate in the same activities
because the state prohibits branching and under federal law, the terminals are branches.
See id. at 948 n.104 (hypothetical used by court exemplified result of narrow reading of
§ 36(c) in state that exempts ATMs from definition of "branch" for state law purposes). The
district court in Marine Midland Bank misapplied the Smith "branch" criteria by ignoring
essential elements of both parts of the test. First, the court assumed that Marine had "es-
tablished" Wegmans' ATM and thus met the first prong of Smith's test, when in fact
Marine neither owned nor rented the ATM. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89, 134-
37. Marine took no part in the selection of the site or hardware of Wegmans' ATM, and did
not supervise its installation or its daily operation. These acts would be evidence of owner-
ship or rental; a transaction fee only gives Marine's customers the opportunity to access
their accounts while away from the bank. See S. Hearings, supra note 78, at 166 (statement
of John C. Elliott). Second, the court decided that Marine had achieved a competitive ad-
vantage over both national and state banks with its utilization of Wegmans' ATM. The
court appeared to ignore the fact that other banks also utilized, or planned to utilize, the
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Other courts will face identical issues and must similarly apply the
outdated McFadden Act of 1927 to modern banking technology.
The Second Circuit based its holding on sound reasoning, but that
will not prevent other circuits from reaching the same conclusion
that the district court reached in Marine Midland Bank. Although
Marine Midland Bank preserved interstate networks in the Sec-
ond Circuit, it will not reduce the litigation to which these net-
works may be subjected in other jurisdictions. 53 Both the Marine
Midland Bank appellate court's reasoning and the strict approach
taken in the district court decision are defensible, which illustrates
that the Second Circuit's holding is subject to attack in subsequent
cases. Continued litigation is inevitable without a federal statutory
solution.1 5 4
The amendment to the National Bank Act' 55 (the Banking
Convenience Act of 1984) would provide a solution to the dilemma
of how to treat shared ATMs utilized by national banks. The
amendment specifically authorizes a national bank to use an auto-
mated device that the bank does not own or rent and clarifies that
the payment of a transactional fee does not constitute the estab-
lishment of any automated device. 156 Under the amendment these
terminals would not be considered branches within the meaning of
section 36(f).157
The amendment addresses the immediate problem of how to
restore competitive equality to the dual banking system in the
same manner that Independent Bankers Association v. Smith re-
stored competitive equality in 1976 and thereby protected state
banks. Smith overruled a Comptroller ruling 58 that in effect pre-
empted state law, particularly in those states with restrictive
branching laws or with statutes that labelled ATMs as branches. 5 '
same terminal and that Wegmans was willing to contract with any financial institution. See
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 14-18, Marine Midland Bank.
153. Each national bank challenged by a state banking commissioner, independent
bankers' association, or state bank may have to prove through litigation that the national
bank's use of a shared ATM and its membership in an interchange network does not consti-
tute illegal branch banking.
154. Litigation costs could discourage investments in shared systems and indirectly
limit their memberships to the detriment of state and national members. See S. Hearings,
supra note 78, at 20 (statement of Michael A. Mancusi, Sr. Deputy Comptroller of the
Currency).
155. S. 2898, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
156. Id. sec. 2, § (i)(2)(B).
157. Id. sec. 2, § (i)(1).
158. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
159. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d at 936 ("Undeniably, the Comp-
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SHARED ATMs
The proposed amendment would do nothing more than maintain
the status quo of the law concerning interstate ATM networks,
support the Comptroller regulation in a more preferable manner
than acquiescence by silence,1 0 and assist national banks by pre-
serving competitive quality. A federal law that addresses the use of
shared ATMs would prevent the national banking system from be-
ing subjected to fifty shared EFT systems laws and would establish
needed uniformity in interstate banking. When establishing their
own ATMs, national banks still would have to comply with state
branching laws and state EFT laws. The amendment, however,
would prevent national banks from having to comply with state
branch banking laws in those states in which state law expressly
exempts state bank ATMs from branching treatment.
The analysis used by the district court in Marine Midland
Bank finds too much precedent in prior case law for the appellate
court's decision to be regarded as the banking industry's solution.
In subsequent litigation in other circuits, courts presented with the
issue of how to treat ATMs easily could ignore or distinguish the
Second Circuit decision and once more restrict a national bank's
use of computer banking technology. Even though the Marine
Midland Bank district court decision was reversed on appeal, Con-
gress should consider seriously the proposed amendment, which
was reintroduced in January of 1985. This amendment is consis-
tent with the deregulation trend that the banking industry has ex-
perienced in the last few years'61 and would avoid further litigation
over the treatment of developing banking technology.
V. CONCLUSION
The district court's analysis in Marine Midland Bank pos-
sessed the potential to undermine the future of regional and na-
tional interchange ATM networks. The Second Circuit clarified the
position that shared ATM networks hold in the dual banking sys-
tem. The circuit court's holding will have a significant effect on
computer banking technology across the country if other courts
troller's ruling ... would give national banks at least a temporary advantage over compet-
ing state banks in those jurisdictions which presently do not permit state-chartered banks to
establish off-premises CBCT's."). Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Ohio, and Virginia still label ATMs as branches. See supra note 40.
160. See Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d at 462.
161. See supra note 148; see also Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.).
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follow Marine Midland Bank in their own struggles over the treat-
ment of EFT systems. Nothing in the Marine Midland Bank case
guarantees that courts in other circuits will rely on the Second Cir-
cuit's rationale or defer to interpretations of the Comptroller and
consistently hold that shared ATMs are not branches. The Bank-
ing Convenience Act of 1984 offers the ideal national solution for
the problem of how to reconcile shared ATM networks with
prohibitions on interstate banking, and Congress should act on this
proposed amendment soon. Without legislative action, Marine
Midland Bank may have only limited influence and precedential
value. In years to come, reciprocal interstate banking may render
these judicial and legislative decisions of limited significance. But
for the present, these decisions provide the dual banking system
with the stability needed to maintain the competitive equality that
the drafters of the McFadden Act envisioned.
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